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The defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, his employer, that he would not accept another situation or establish himself in
any business within fifteen miles of London, without the written consent
of the plaintiff, for a period of three years after leaving the plaintiffs
service; but such permission was not to be withheld if it could be proved
to the satisfaction of the plaintiff that the situation sought or the business
established was not for the sale of the same class of goods as those sold
by the plaintiff.
Held, on a motion for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
breaking the agreement, that the clause providing that the plaintiff's
permission was not to be withheld unless the business in which the
defendant engaged was in the same class of goods as the plaintiff's,
showed that the restrictive clause was intended to apply to all kinds of
business whatsoever, and was, therefore, wider than was necessary for
the protection of the plaintiff, and void.
CONTRACTS IN RuSTRAINT OF ORDINARY TRADES.

For the purposes of this annotation it will be convenient to divide
the subject into: (i) The Rules of
Law Governing these Contracts,
and their Application to Contracts
in Restraint of Ordinary Trades;
(2) Contracts in Restraint of those
Sorts of Business in which the
Public has a Peculiar Interest ; (3)
Combinations to Form Monopolies
by Restrictions on Competition and
Production.
(I) Contracts in restraint of trade
-wereoriginally void at common law
on account of public policy, and
they were opposed to public policy
for two reasons, one being the in-

jury to the public by being deprived
of the restricted party's industry,
and the other being the injury to
the party himself by being precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus being prevented from
supporting himself and family: 2
Henry V., pl. 22; Colgate v. Bachelor, Cro. Eliz., 872; Oregon S. S.
Cozupany v. Winsor, 20 Wall, 64.
See also Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal.,
342; Pollock on Contracts, 31.3;
Parsons on Contracts, Vol. 2, 255.
The general rule at present with
reference to these contracts would
seem to be that they are valid provided that the restriction be reason-

1 L. R., 1892, 2 Ch. Div., 149, May, 1892.

OF ORDINARY TRADES.

able, and founded upon a good consideration: Homer v. Groves, 7
Bing., 735; Mitchell v. Reynolds,
I P. Wms., 181; Davies z. Davies,
L. R., 36, Ch. Div., 348; Rousillon
v. Rousillon, 14 Id., 351; Collins v.
Locke, 4 Appeal Cases, 674; Oregon
S. S. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall., 64;
Watertown Thermometer Co. v.
Pool, 5 Hun., 157; Coal Co. v. Coal
Co., 68 Pa. St., 173; Ellerman v. C.
J. R. & U. S. Y. Co, 23 Atlantic,
287; Mills v. Dunham, 91 Ch., 576;
C. A. Perls v. Saalfield, 92, 2 Ch.,
T49 C. A.; and the burden of proof
is on the person alleging the invalidity: Mills v. Dunham, sUp ra;
Perls v. Saalfield, subra; though
the tendency of all the cases prior
to these last two was to treat these
contracts as being fprima fade invalid. The question as to whether
or not a given restraint is reasonable or not is a question of law:
Mullan v. May, ii M. & AV., 548,
and the test as to what constitutes
reasonableness is the one furnished
by TINDAL, C. J., in Homer v.
Graves, 7 Bing., 735, and which has
been followed in all the later cases.
He says: "And I do not see how a
better test can be applied to the
question whether the agreement is
reasonable or not than by considering whether the restraint is such
only as to afford a fair protection to
the interest of the party in favor of
whom it is given, and not so large
as to interfere with the interest of
the public. Whatever restraint is
larger than the necessary protection
of the party can be of no benefit to
either of the parties; it can only be
oppressive, and if oppressive it is
in the eye of the law unreasonable.
Whatever is injurious to the interest
of the public is void on the ground
of public policy."
Examples of
contracts which have stood this

test may be found in Mitchell v.
Reynolds, i P. WVms., 181; Gale v.
Read, 8 East, 8o; Whitaker v. Howe,
3 Beavan, 383; Bunn v. Guy, 4 East,
190; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E.,
654; Davies v. Lowen, 64 L. Times,
655; Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J.
Eq., 370; Martin v. Murphy, 129
Ind., 464; Ellerman v. C. J. R. &
U. S. Y. Co., 23 Atlantic, 287;
Kieth v. H. 0. Co., 2 S. W., 777;
Washburn v. Dorsch,. 3 2 N. W., 551.
While in the following cases the
restraint was deemed unreasonable:
Homer v. Graves, 7 Ring., 735;
Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W., 548;
Perls v. Saalfield, 92 2 Ch. 149, C.
A. Mandeville v. Herman, 42 N.
J. Eq., 185; Carroll v. Giles, 3o S.
C., 412. See also cases cited infra.
It was the law in England for a
long time that a restraint co-extensive with the limits of the
country was, ifiso facto, invalid,
irrespective as to whether it was
necessary for the protection of the
promisee: Prugnell v. Gosse, Aleyn,
67; Parker, C. J., in Mitchell V.
Reynolds, I P. Wms., 181; Parke;
B., in Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W.,
548; Hinde v. Gray, i Man. & Gr.,
195; Sir John Wickens in Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, I5 Eq., 59;
Cotton, L. J., in Davies v. Davies,
36 Ch. Div., 351; Sir Montague
Smith, in Collins v. Locke, 4 Appeal Cases, 674. The rule at present
in England would seem to be that
such a restraint is valid, provided
that it fulfills Tindall, C. J.'s, test
as to reasonableness: Sir W. M.
James, in Leather Cloth Co. v.
Lorsont, L. R., 9 Eq., 345; RousilIon v. Rousillon, L. R., 14 Ch.
Div., 551; Baron Bramwell, in
Jones v. Lees, i H "&N., I89; Vhitaker v. Howe, 3 Beavan, 383; Mills
v. Dunham, 9 i , I Ch., 576 C. A. It
is not difficult to find a reason for
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the existence of the old hard and
fast rule that any restraint co-extensive with the limits of the
country must be, ipsofacto, invalid,
because at the time the rule was
first laid down there was no business whose operation extended
throughout the entire country, and,
therefore, such a restraint could not
be necessary for the protection of
the promisee, as it extended further
than his business, or, as PARKER,
C. J., said, in Mitchell v. Reynolds,
"what does it signify to a tradesiiian in London what another does
at Newcastle. And surely it would
be unreasonable to fix a certain loss
on one side without any benefit on
the other." At the present day,
however, thanks to.the facilities of
communication which the railroad,
telegraph and felephone afford, the
operations of a particular business
may extend all over the country,
and the reason for the rule having"
ceased owing to public policy no
longer requiring its enforcement, it
would seem that the sole test as to
the validity of a restraint should be
its reasonableness.
In the United States there are
two artificial limits of space, the
State and the United States, and
the above strict rule might be applied in either one or two ways: (a)
as to restraints covering any particular State; or (b) as to restraints
extending throughout the United
States.
(A) It was at one time thought
that a restraint that would not
permit a man to pursue his occupation, or trade anywhere in the
State was, ipso facto, void, for
"with regard to domestic interests
each State is a separate community, and it is by no means the
same thing to the people of a State
whether an individual carries on
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its trade within or without its
borders :" Lawrence v. Kidder, io
Barb., 641; Chapel v. Brockway,
21 Wend., 157; Taylor v. Blanchard,
13 Allen, 375; Wright v. Ryder, 36
Cal., 312; and that is the law in
Michigan at the present day:
Western Wooden Ware Asso. v.
Starkey, 84 Mich., 76. The later
cases, however, hold that such a
restraint is not, ipsofado, invalid:
Oregon S. S. Co. v. Winsor, 20
Wall., 64; Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich.,
490; Hereshoff v. Boutineau, 19
Atlantic, 712. See also cases cited
infra.
(B) It is impossible to determine,
in view of the difference of the authorities, whether a restraint coextensive with the boundaries of
the United States is, ipsofado,void.
In Iowa, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio, and possibly in the
Federal courts, such a restraint
would not be sustained. Mr. Justice BRADLIw, in Oregon S. S. Co.
v. Winsor, 20 Wall., 64; Bishop v.
Palmer, 146 Mass., 469; Handforth
v. Jackson, 15o Id., 149; Taylor v.
Sanerman, iio Pa. St., 3; Lange v.
Werk, 2 Ohio St., 519; Chaplin v.
Brown, Iowa, 48 N.M.W.,8o6; while
in New York, Missouri and Minnesota they would seem to follow
the modern English rule: Diamond
Match Co. v. Rouber, io6 N. Y.,
473; Watertown Thermometer Co.
v. Pool, 51 Hun., 157; Tode v. Gross,
127 N.Y., 464; Underwood v. Smith,
19 N. Y. S., 380; National Bank v.
Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn., 272;
compare FUrr.R, C. J., in Gibbs v.
Baltimore Gas Co., 13o U. S, 396,
and BRADLEY, J., in Oregon S. S.
Co. V.Winsor, 20 Wall., 64.
. The fact that the restraint is unlimited in point of time is no objection to its validity: Ward v.
Byrne, 5 M. & W., 548; Munmford
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z, Gething, 7 C. B. N. S., 317; Beard
v. Dennis, 6 Ind., 200; Cook v.
Johnson, 47 Con., 175; Bunn v.
Guy, 4 East, i9o; French v. Parker,
14 Atlantic, 870. Agreements in
restraint of trade are divisible and
may be valid in part and void elsewhere, as in Smith's Appeal, 113
Pa. St., 579, where a covenant not
to engage in the manufacture of
ochre "in the county of Lehigh or
elsewhere," was held valid as to
that county and void as to elsewhere. See also Mallan v. May,
ii M. & IV., 653; Price v. Green,
16 Ibid., 346; Oregon S. S. Co. v.
Winsor, 20 Wall., 64; Davies v.
Lowen, 64 L. Times, 655; Lange v.
Werk, 2 Ohio St., 519; c. f. More
v. Bonnet, 40 Cal., 251; Bishop v.
Palmer, 146 Mass., 469.
The Court will not inquire into
the adequacy of the 'consideration
necessary to support such a contract, and only such consideration;
is required as is necessary to support any contract not under seal:
Hitchcock v,. Coker,6 Ad.& El., 438;
Pilkington v. Scott, i5 M. & W.,
657; Guerand v. Daudelet, 32 Md.,
56r; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass., 223;
McClung's App., 58 Pa. St., 31;
c. f. Baron PARKE in Young V.
Timmins, i Tyrth, 226; and it has
been held that the presence of a
seal alone is not a sufficient consideration, on the theory apparently
that as contracts in restraint of
trade are pirima facie invalid, and
as this presumption can only be
overcome by the existence of certain facts, among which is the
presence of a good consideration, a
seal alone will not rebut the presumption of invalidity: Hutton v.
Parker, 7 Dowling, 739; Gompert
v. Rochester, 56 Pa. St., 194.
Whether this is the law at present
or not is a mooted question, in view

of the fact that the last two decisions in England have held that
there is no presumption of invalidity in the case of contracts in
restraint of trade and, therefore,
the reason as given above would
seem to have lost its force.
In Mills v. Dunham, '91 1 Ch. C.
A., 576, Mr. Justice CHrTTY lays
down the following rule for the
construction of those contracts.
"When a covenant oragreement is
impeached on the ground that it
contains an unreasonable restraint
of trade, the duty of the Court is
first to interpret the covenant or
agreement itself and to ascertain,
according to the ordinary rules of
construction, what is the fairmeaning of the parties, and then to apply
the rule as to reasonableness with
reference to the extent of the impeached covenant, and then to see
see
whether it goes too far:"
Talcott 7v.Brackitt; 5 Bradwell, 6o;
36o.
Ferry Co. v. Ferry Co., 72 Ill.,
If the restraint be limited as to
space, the contract itself prescribing
no method for measuring that
space, the distance shall be calculated "as the crow flies," and not
necessarily by the usual means of
approach: Dingman v. Walker, i
Johnson, 44o; Mouflet v,.Cole, L.
R., 7 Exch., 70. If the agreement
be valid when made, subsequent circumstances, such as the promisee's
retiring from business, do not affect
its validity: Elves v. Crofts, io C.
B., 24r; Jones v. Lees, I H. & N.,
189; Cook v. Johnson, 47 Con., 175;
and such an agreement is assignable
with the interest it protects: Hedge
v. Lowe, 47 Iowa, 137; Gompert v.
Rochester, 56 Pa. St., 198; PemberVaughn, 59 F. C. L. R., 87.
ton v*.
If the contract be reasonable when
entered into, the Court is not bound
to look for probable and extrava-
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gant contingencies in order to invalidate it: Rannie v. Irving, 7
Man. & Gr., 969. The parties to
the contract, however, must fix the
terms of the restraint themselves,
and a covenant to retire from business, "so far as the law allows," is
too vague to be enforced: Davies 7v.
Davies, L. R., 36 Ch. D., 348.
As a general rule if these contracts are valid at law, an injunction will lie to prevent their breach:
Kimball v. Keane, 6 Sim., 635;
Kimberly v. Jennings, Ibid., 64o;
Whitaker v. Howe, 3 Beavan, 383;
Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L.R.,
9 Eq., 345; Hall's Appeal, 6o Pa.
St., 456; Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind.,
20o; Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. St.,
579; but notwithstanding its validity at law a chancellor will not enforce such a contract if its terms are
hard or even complex: Kimberly
v. Jennings, 6 Sir., 640; Keeler v.
Taylor, 53 Pa. St., 463.
The rule at common law was that
if these contracts were unlawful
they were only so in the sense that
they could not be enforced either at
law or in equity, and the formation
of such a contract did not in itself
constitute an indictable or actionable offence: Price.v. Green, i6 M.
& W., 346; Hilton v. Eckersley, 6
El. & BI., 47; Mogul S. S. Co. v.
McGregor, 23 Q. B. Div., 598;
Hornly v. Close, L. R., 2 Q. B., 153;
C. f., CROMPTON, J., in Hilton v.
Eskersley, and Lord ESHaR, M.R.,
in Magul S. S. Co. v. McGregor.
For the statutes on this subject see
Stimson's American Statute Law,
Vol. I, 4r3o B; Vol. II, 8252, and
?. 990o-99o5.
(2) Contracts in restraint of those
sorts of business in the exercise of
which the public has a peculiar interest; (a) if the policy of the law
be to restrain the exercise of any

particular business, contracts affecting such restraint are perfectly
valid, as in the case of patents:
Morse Twist Drill & Machine Co.
v. Morse, IO3 Mass., 73; Shade Roller Co. v. Cnshman, 143 Mass., 353;
Fowle v. Parke, 131 U. S., 88; Gloucester Isinglass & Glue Co. v. Russian Cement Co., 27 N. E., Io5;
c. f. Berlin Machine Works v.
Perry, 38 N. W., 82; restrictions on
the use of trade secrets: Bryson v'.
Whitehead, I Sir. & Stu., 74;
Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R.,
9 Eq., 345; Pickery v. Welch, i9
Pick., 523; Tode v. Gross, 127 N.

Y., 480; embargo bonds while in
the Embargo Act vas in force:
Dixon v. U. S., i Brock., 177; and
bonds not to engage in the sale of
liquor in a particular State when
the policy of the law in that State
is to discourage its sale' Harrison
v. Lockhart, 25 Ind., 112. (b) If it
is the policy of the law that in any
given business there shall be no restriction in the exercise thereof,
then any restriction whatsoever
will be void. Thus the grant of an
exclusive right of way for a tract of
land for the Oil Pipe Line is void, it
being the policy of the law in West
Virginia to promote such lines:
Transportation Co. v. Pipe Line Co.,
22 W. Va., 6oo; so also a contract
by a railroad company granting to
a telegraph company the exclusive
use and occupation of its right of
way for telegraph purposes is void:
W. U. Tel. Co. v. A. U. Tel. Co., 65
Ga., i6o; sed. c. f. C. P. Ry. Co. V. W.
U. Tel. Co., 17 Can. S. C. R., i5i; but

a stipulation in a contract between
a railroad company and a sleeping
car company that the latter company should have exclusive right
for fifteen years to furnish drawing
room and sleeping cars for the former company's use is valid and will
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be enforced: C., St. L. & N. 0. R.
Co. v. P. S. Car Co., 139 U. S., 79;
and a Palace Car Company, which
was chartered to engage in the business of transporting passengers in
railroad cars constructed and owned
by the said company cannot agree
with a similar company that one of
them shall lease all its corporate
property to the other for ninetynine years, and in the meantime
the lessor shall go out of business,
as suchan agreement is in restraint
of trade and opposed to public policy: Central Transportation Co. v.
Pullman Palace Car Co., 129 U. S.,
24. In Chicago Gas Light Co. v.
People's Gas Light Co., 121 Ill., 530,
a gas manufacturing company had
been granted the exclusive privilege of supplying gas to the City of
Chicago for ten years; at the expiration of the ten years another corporation was granted this privilege
concurrently with the first; these
companies divided the city and
agreed not to compete with each
other; the agreement was heldvoid
as being in restraint of trade and
opposed to public policy. So also
contracts between railroad companies under which they agree not to
extend their lines so as to compete
with each other are void, the object
being to give one road a monopoly:
H. &N.H. R.R.Co. v.N. Y.&N.
H. R. R. Co., 3 iRob., 411; State v.
H. & N. H. R. R. Co., 29 Con., 538;
Denver & N. 0. R. R. Co. v. A. T.
& S. F. R. R. Co., I5 Fed. Rep., 65o,
but if the contract is between two
parallel roads under which certain
natural tributary territory is preserved for each where they can construct branch lines without competition from each other, the object of
the contract is to prevent competition ruinous to both roads, then the
contract will be enforced: Ives v.
Smith, 3 N. Y. S., 645.

(3) Combinations to form Monopolies by Restrictions on Compietition and Production.-Restrictions on competition in order to
prevent its becoming excessive are
perfectly valid provided they be
carried into effect by proper means,
that is, "by provisions reasonably
necessary for the purpose:" per
MONTAGUE SMITH in

Collins v.

Locke, 4 App. Cases, 674; BARRETT,
J., in People v. North River Sugar
Refining Co., 54 Hun., 354. If,
however, the object be to obtain a
monopoly of any particular business, and not merely to prevent
ruinous competition, then the
agreement is contrary to public
policy, and will not be enforced;
and by statute in some States,
and in interstate commerce by
Act of Congress (Act of July
2, I89O), such an attempt constitutes an indictable offence:
Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio,
349; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434;
India Bagging Asso. v. Kock, i4
La. An., 168; Morris Run Coal Co.
v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St., 173;
Arnot v. Pottstown and Elmira
Coal Co., 68 N. Y., 558; Craft v.
McConoughy,'79 Ill., 346; Salt Co.
v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St., 666; Hoffman v. Brooks, 23 Am. LAw REG.,
648; Collins v. Locke, 4 App. Cases,
674; Mill and Lumber Co. v. Hayes,
76 Cal., 387; People v. North River
Sugar Refining Co., 54 Hun., 354;
Chaplin v. Brown, 48 N. W., io74
(Ia.); Pacific Factor Co. v. Adley,
90 Cal., iio; DeWitt Wire Cloth Co.
v. N.J. Wire Cloth Co., 14 N. Y. S.,
277; Urmston v. Whitelegg, 63 Law
Times, 455; Anderson v. Jett, 89
Ky., 375; P. C. Co. v. McMillan,
19 N.Y,46; Emery v. Ohio Candle
Co., 47 Ohio St., 320; More v. Bennett (111.
Sup.), 29 N. E., 888; Strait
v. National Harrow Co. (Sup.), 18
N. Y. S., 224; Judd v. Harrington

